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Summary
Background—Antivirals (e.g. oseltamivir) are important for mitigating influenza epidemics. In 
2007, an oseltamivir-resistant seasonal A(H1N1) strain emerged and spread to global fixation 
within one year. This showed that antiviral-resistant (AVR) strains can be intrinsically more 
transmissible than their contemporaneous antiviral-sensitive (AVS) counterpart. Surveillance of 
AVR fitness is therefore essential.
Methods—We define the fitness of AVR strains as their reproductive number relative to their co-
circulating AVS counterparts. We develop a simple method for real-time estimation of AVR fitness 
from surveillance data. This method requires only information on generation time without other 
specific details regarding transmission dynamics. We first use simulations to validate this method 
by showing that it yields unbiased and robust fitness estimates in most epidemic scenarios. We 
then apply this method to two retrospective case studies and one hypothetical case study.
Findings—We estimate that (i) the oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) strain that emerged in 2007 
was 4% (3–5%) more transmissible than its oseltamivir-sensitive predecessor and (ii) the 
oseltamivir-resistant pandemic A(H1N1) strain that emerged and circulated in Japan during 2013–
2014 was 24% (17–30%) less transmissible than its oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart. We show 
that in the event of large-scale antiviral interventions during a pandemic with co-circulation of 
AVS and AVR strains, our method can be used to inform optimal use of antivirals by monitoring 
intrinsic AVR fitness and drug pressure on the AVS strain.
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Conclusions—We have developed a simple method that can be easily integrated into 
contemporary influenza surveillance systems to provide reliable estimates of AVR fitness in real 
time.
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National Institute of General Medical Sciences (grant no. U54 GM088558), Area of Excellence 
Scheme of the Hong Kong University Grants Committee (grant no. AoE/M-12/06).
Influenza antiviral drugs are important for mitigating influenza epidemics. The 
neuraminidase (NA) inhibitor oseltamivir is the most commonly used influenza antivirals (1) 
and has been extensively stockpiled by many countries for pandemic preparedness (2). The 
effectiveness of antivirals is threatened by emergence and spread of antiviral resistance 
(AVR) viruses. For oseltamivir, the most commonly detected resistance mutation in 
A(H1N1) viruses is the NA H275Y substitution. Before 2007, emergence of oseltamivir-
resistant influenza viruses were sporadically reported, and the fitness of detected resistant 
viruses had always been substantially compromised (3). As such, there was a consensus that 
AVR influenza viruses would always be outcompeted by their antiviral-sensitive (AVS) 
counterparts, and hence posed only minimal threat to public health.
Such conventional wisdom was refuted by events in 2007–2008 – a new oseltamivir-resistant 
A(H1N1) virus emerged and displaced its contemporaneous oseltamivir-sensitive 
counterpart to become the dominant A(H1N1) strain globally within only 12 months (4). 
The emergence and rapid fixation of this oseltamivir-resistant virus was not driven by 
widespread use of oseltamivir (4, 5). This event thus proved that AVR viruses are not 
necessarily less transmissible than their AVS counterparts. Furthermore, in the context of 
large-scale antiviral intervention during a pandemic, AVR fitness may be enhanced by the 
drug pressure on the AVS strain such that an intrinsically less transmissible AVR strain may 
become more fit than the AVS strain. Timely and accurate assessment of AVR fitness is 
therefore essential for informing situational awareness and optimal use of antivirals during 
both inter-pandemic and pandemic periods (6).
The spread of AVR influenza viruses can increase morbidity and mortality. For example, 
case-fatality risk may increase because antivirals would be ineffective for treating AVR 
cases. Furthermore, if AVR viruses spread during the early stage of a pandemic, populations 
at the downstream of global spread will be subject to substantial importation and hence 
higher incidence of AVR cases (7). In view of such risks, national and supranational 
agencies, especially the WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System 
(GISRS), have emphasized the need for timely and accurate assessment of AVR fitness (8). 
However, few advances have been made in data analytics and performance evaluation for 
AVR surveillance systems. Our objective is to help fill this knowledge gap by developing a 
simple method for estimating AVR fitness from surveillance data.
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Methods
The model
We assume that there is only one transmissible AVR strain over the course of a single 
epidemic wave constituted by the A subtype or B lineage to which the AVR strain and its 
antiviral-sensitive counterpart (the AVS strain) belong. We define the intrinsic AVR fitness 
as the ratio of the basic reproductive number of the AVR strain to that of the AVS strain 
( ). Similarly, we define AVR fitness as the ratio of their reproductive numbers 
( ) which encapsulates the combined effect of intrinsic fitness and any reduction 
in AVS transmissibility due to antiviral interventions.
We formulate our model under the following base case assumptions:
1. The AVS and AVR strains co-circulate during the epidemic.
2. Without antiviral treatment, AVS and AVR infections have the same severity 
such that all infections are equally likely to be selected for AVR testing.
3. Recovery from infection with either strain provides complete cross-protection 
against both strains during the epidemic.
4. The effect of viral interference (if any) caused by all other circulating influenza 
viruses (i.e. those from other subtypes and lineages) and pathogens are the same 
for both strains.
5. AVR fitness does not depend on age.
6. Age-specific susceptibility to the AVR virus is the same as that to the AVS virus.
Assumptions 5 and 6 are relatively less likely to hold, e.g. high-risk groups may be more 
likely to receive antiviral prophylaxis, susceptibility to the AVR virus may be different from 
that to the AVS virus (9). In the Appendix (see Appendix page 5), we extend our method to 
allow relaxation of these two assumptions.
Under the base case assumptions, the next generation matrix of AVR infections is simply 
times that of AVS infections. This remains true in the presence of seasonal forcing and 
interventions such as vaccination and school closure because transmission of the AVS and 
AVR strain are identically affected by these factors (see Appendix page 2). As the epidemic 
unfolds, the proportion of infections that are AVR, denoted by , will increase towards 1 if 
, remain at the same level if , and decline towards 0 if . The key step of our 
method is to approximate  using the equation
(1)
where  is the total incidence rate of AVR and AVS infections,  and  are the 
generation time distributions for AVR and AVS infections, respectively. To verify the 
accuracy of this approximation, we randomly generate 100 epidemic scenarios driven by the 
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UK contact matrix (10) with four age groups (0–5, 6–18, 18–65, and >65) using Latin-
hypercube sampling from the following parameter space which covers a wide range of 
plausible epidemics:
• Initial susceptible proportion of each age group between 0.3 and 1;
• Initial reproductive number of the AVS strain ( ) between 1.2 and 3;
• Mean generation time (Tg) between 2 and 4 days;
• Intrinsic AVR fitness ( ) between 0.8 and 1.2;
• The proportion of seeding infections that are AVR between 0.1 and 0.9;
Figure A1 (see Appendix page 8) shows that the approximation in equation (1) is very 
accurate. As such, given  or a proxy of it (see below) and the generation time distribution 
for both strains, equation (1) allows us to accurately describe  without knowing other 
epidemiologic details such as basic reproductive number, contact matrix, symptomatic 
proportion, seasonality, etc.
Inference of AVR fitness
Our method requires the following two streams of data (for the subtype or lineage under 
investigation):
1. The incidence rate  or its proxy, e.g. based on the daily number of laboratory 
confirmed infections in the Hong Kong E-Flu system (11), Flu Near You (12), or 
other proxies used for calculating influenza excess mortality (13). We denote this 
data stream by . These data are typically confounded with temporal 
fluctuation in reporting rate and laboratory testing capacity. Our method, 
however, is robust against such fluctuation (see Results).
2. Data from AVR surveillance where  and are the number of influenza 
positive isolates tested on day d that are found to be positive and negative for 
AVR, respectively. The subjects selected for AVR testing should (i) have not 
been treated with antivirals for their infection and (ii) have no recent travel 
history to avoid misclassifying imported cases as local cases.
We substitute  with its proxy  in equation (1) and denote the resulting approximation 
by . The approximate likelihood is
where , psens and pspec are the sensitivity 
and specificity of AVR testing. With this likelihood and uniform priors, we estimate AVR 
fitness  using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (see Appendix page 3).
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Validation of the AVR fitness inference method
To validate our method, we simulate 100 stochastic realizations of the data streams for each 
of the 100 epidemic scenarios generated earlier assuming that (i) daily reporting proportions 
are uniform random variables ranging between 0.5% and 2%; and (ii) daily AVR testing 
capacity is 2, 5, 10, 20 or 80 isolates. AVR fitness is then inferred at the end of each 
epidemic.
Case Studies
After validating our method, we apply it to three case studies:
1. A retrospective study of the oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus in 
2007 – 2008. To estimate the (intrinsic) fitness of this oseltamivir-resistant strain 
in comparison to its oseltamivir-sensitive predecessor, we retrieve the data on 
influenza virus activity and AVR surveillance for 10 countries/regions from 
published literature and public online data (Tables A1–A3 on page 13–17 of 
Appendix, Figure 3). We assume that AVS and AVR infections had the same 
generation time distribution because there is no published evidence that indicates 
the contrary. Based on published serial interval estimates, we assume that the 
generation time distribution was lognormal with mean 2.8 days and coefficient of 
variation 0.54 (14). We first obtain a pooled estimate of AVR fitness by assuming 
that AVR fitness was the same in all populations. We then estimate AVR fitness 
in each population separately and compare them.
2. A retrospective study of the oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus 
in Japan during 2013–2014. Although 98% of the tested A(H1N1)pdm09 virus 
isolates were sensitive to oseltamivir by 2014 (8), large clusters of oseltamivir-
resistant variants were detected in Newcastle, Australia in 2011 (15) and 
Hokkaido, Japan in 2013–2014 (16). In the Japan cluster, the oseltamivir-
resistant virus was causing community outbreaks until it was displaced by its 
oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart (Figure 2). We apply our method to estimate the 
fitness of this oseltamivir-resistant strain using published data (16) and the 
generation time distribution in case study 1.
3. A hypothetical study of AVR fitness and drug pressure under large-scale antiviral 
interventions during a pandemic. Oseltamivir resistance is not uncommon among 
influenza viruses with pandemic potential, e.g. avian influenza A(H5N1) (17) 
and A(H7N9) viruses (18). We consider a hypothetical but realistic situation in 
which large-scale antiviral interventions, comprising both prophylaxis and 
treatment, are implemented during a pandemic that comprises co-circulation of 
AVS and AVR viruses (7, 19–21). The epidemic parameters are the same as that 
in Figure 2 with all individuals susceptible at time 0. We consider situations in 
which (i) the AVR strain is intrinsically less transmissible than the AVS strain 
with ; and (ii) large-scale antiviral interventions reduce the AVS 
reproductive number by a proportion μ such that drug pressure renders the AVS 
strain less transmissible than the AVR strain, i.e. . We consider 
10%, 15% and 20% coverage of antiviral prophylaxis that reduces susceptibility 
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to the AVS virus by 81% (22); this corresponds to μ = 0.08, 0.12 and 0.16, 
respectively. We assume that ,  and μ are unknown a priori and demonstrate 
how our method can be used to estimate them in real-time to inform optimal use 
of antivirals. Specifically, if AVR fitness is consistently estimated to exceed 1 
with high probability (say, above 0.9 for one week), then there is compelling 
evidence that an increasing proportion of severe cases would be AVR and hence 
not treatable with the antiviral. We assume that in response to this alert, antiviral 
use would be suspended except for treating high-risk and severe cases as 
policymakers deliberate (i) how to strategically adjust antiviral use to strike a 
balance between reducing transmission of AVS infections and increasing the 
number of severe AVR infections, and (ii) whether alternative treatment options 
such as convalescent plasma and antivirals with different resistance mechanisms 
should be considered (7, 20, 21, 23). The objective of this case study is to 
demonstrate how estimates of  and μ can be used to build an evidence base for 
this decision-making process.
Role of the funding sources
The sponsors of the study had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data 
interpretation, or writing of the report. The corresponding author had full access to all the 
data in the study and had final responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
Results
Validating the method for estimating AVR fitness
Figure 1 summarizes the accuracy and precision of AVR fitness estimates across a wide 
range of plausible epidemic scenarios when AVR testing sensitivity and specificity are both 
100% (a reasonable assumption for genotypic testing). The reliability of fitness estimates 
depends on epidemic characteristics mainly via the time span, expressed in terms of number 
of generation intervals, during which the AVS and AVR strains are both circulating in 
significant proportions. Fitness estimates are largely unbiased unless this time span is below 
10 generation intervals (around 30 days) and AVR testing capacity is low (<5 samples per 
day). Increasing the daily testing capacity beyond 20 samples provides little improvement in 
the fitness estimates. The accuracy and precision of fitness estimates deteriorate significantly 
when testing sensitivity and specificity are both reduced to 90% which has a similar effect as 
halving the testing capacity (Figure A2 on page 9 of Appendix).
Timeliness of AVR fitness estimates
Figure 2 illustrates the timeliness of reliable AVR fitness estimates for one stochastic 
realization of an exemplary epidemic scenario. The AVS and AVR reproductive numbers 
differ by 5% which is sufficiently high to result in fixation within a single epidemic wave. 
The daily AVR testing capacity is 10 samples, a modest level for well-resourced populations 
like Hong Kong. Our method correctly predicts which virus would become dominant with 
posterior probability consistently above 0.9 as early as three weeks before the epidemic 
peak. However, stochasticity has a strong impact on the timeliness of reliable fitness 
estimates. Figures A3 (see Appendix page 10) shows two alternative realizations of the same 
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epidemic scenarios in which reliable fitness estimates are available a couple of weeks sooner 
or later than in Figure 2.
Case study 1: Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus, 2007 – 2008
The pooled (intrinsic) AVR fitness estimate is 1.04 (95% credible interval 1.03–1.05), i.e. 
the oseltamivir-resistant strain was 4% (3%–5%) more transmissible than its 
contemporaneous oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart (Figure 3). The fitness estimate increases 
(decreases) by 0.01 when we increase (decrease) Tg by one day. If the data were available in 
real-time, reliable fitness estimates would have been available by late February 2008, which 
was 15 weeks after the oseltamivir-resistant virus was first identified in Norway and months 
before it became dominant in populations outside Europe (24). If we estimate AVR fitness in 
each population separately, the results suggest that the oseltamivir-resistant strain was more 
transmissible than the oseltamivir-sensitive strain only in Canada, Luxembourg, the UK, 
Germany and France, but not in the other five populations (Figure 3). In particular, there is 
no strong evidence that the oseltamivir-resistant strain was more transmissible than its 
oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart in Japan (25). The intrinsic AVR fitness estimates remain 
unchanged when the effect of drug pressure in Japan is explicitly modelled (see Appendix 
page 4).
Case study 2: Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in Japan, 2013–2014
We estimate that this oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was 24% (17%–30%) less 
transmissible than the oseltamivir-sensitive strain that displaced it (Figure 4). Such 
differential transmissibility was not detected by in vitro competitive growth and in vivo 
ferret transmission experiments (16). In retrospect, our method could have correctly 
predicted that the AVR virus was less transmissible that its AVS counterpart (with posterior 
probability > 0.95) after both viruses had co-circulated for two weeks, which corresponds to 
four weeks before the AVR virus was displaced.
Case study 3: Estimating AVR fitness and drug pressure on the AVS strain under large-
scale antiviral interventions during a pandemic
Figure 5 shows that reliable estimates of  and μ are typically available within one to two 
weeks after antiviral interventions are suspended. These estimates can be used to inform the 
optimal use of antivirals. For example, if policymakers resume large-scale antiviral 
prophylaxis with coverage equal to γ times the baseline level, then the resulting AVR fitness 
would be  which can be used to assess the downstream effect of increased AVR 
incidence, e.g. increase in case-fatality risk due to more cases not treatable with antivirals.
Discussion
We have developed a simple method for estimating AVR fitness from influenza AVR 
surveillance data. Characterization of the nonlinear epidemic dynamics underlying 
surveillance data typically requires inference of multiple parameters in transmission models 
(e.g. basic reproductive number, reporting rate, etc.) (26). Our method bypasses such 
complexity and is therefore easy to implement.
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Conventionally, AVR fitness is assessed based on in vitro experiments examining kinetics of 
neuraminidases and virus replications in cell cultures, or in vivo experiments examining 
viral load and virus transmission in animal models (27). As illustrated in our second case 
study, fitness estimates from such laboratory settings do not necessarily conform with that 
observed in actual community transmission settings (16). Moreover, as the 2007 experience 
showed, experiments performed using different genetic background may give different 
results (28). Nonetheless, these experiments are indispensable for early detection of 
transmissible AVR viruses. Our method complements these experiments by providing 
population-level fitness estimates when both AVS and AVR viruses co-circulate.
Timeliness of AVR surveillance depends on the capacity and turnaround time of AVR 
testing. Current influenza AVR surveillance mainly relies on the WHO Collaborating 
Centers (WHO CCs) in GISRS with antiviral susceptibility testing capacity available mainly 
in five WHO CCs, namely Atlanta, Beijing, London, Melbourne and Tokyo (8). National 
influenza centers collect clinical specimens and send representative virus isolates to one of 
the WHO CCs for more advanced analyses. However, patient-specific clinical and 
epidemiological data for these isolates, such as gender, age, geographic location, healthcare 
setting, antiviral treatment history and vaccination status, are often incomplete or missing, 
especially when these samples are not collected by the sentinel surveillance systems. 
Routine collection of these data (e.g. antiviral treatment history) can enhance the 
performance of AVR surveillance.
The turnaround time of AVR testing depends on our knowledge regarding the genetic 
mechanisms that confer AVR. If the genetic markers associated with AVR are known a priori 
(e.g. the NA H275Y mutation (27)), the turnaround time for genotypic tests are usually 1–2 
days. In contrast, phenotypic tests for antiviral susceptibility (e.g. neuraminidase inhibition 
assay (8)) are necessary for monitoring emergence of AVR strains with previously unknown 
AVR mechanisms (27). Phenotypic tests are much more labor intensive than genotypic tests 
with a turnaround time of 1–2 weeks. Following the discovery of a new strain with unknown 
AVR mechanism, further investigations would be needed to characterize the associated 
genetic markers. As such, real-time surveillance for novel AVR strains will likely incur a 
lead time of at least several weeks.
In our first case study, we estimate that the oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus 
that emerged and became globally dominant in 2007–2008 was 4% more transmissible than 
its oseltamivir-sensitive predecessor. This is consistent with the findings in Chao et al (29) in 
which the fitness advantage of the oseltamivir-resistant strain was estimated to be 1.7% to 
2.4% based on the rate at which it spread around the globe. Both studies indicate that an 
AVR strain with a fitness advantage of as little as 2% to 4% would spread to fixation both 
locally and globally within months. If large-scale antiviral intervention is implemented 
during a pandemic, the resulting drug pressure on the AVS strain might confer such 
magnitude of fitness advantage to an intrinsically less transmissible AVR strain. In such 
context, timely and robust surveillance of AVR fitness is essential for informing optimal use 
of antivirals. For example, given that antiviral therapy will likely be the first-line treatment 
for severe cases during a pandemic, an increase in AVR/AVS incidence ratio and growing 
ineffectiveness of antivirals in treating AVR cases might increase the overall pandemic 
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mortality. Estimates of intrinsic AVR fitness and drug pressure on the AVS strain provided 
by our method would thus be useful for assessing the risk of such outcome, though a 
comprehensive evaluation of optimal antiviral use would require knowledge of additional 
parameters (e.g. reproductive number, antiviral efficacy in reducing mortality, etc.) (30).
In our method, AVR fitness corresponds to the combined effect of intrinsic AVR fitness and 
the drug pressure posed on the AVS strain by population-wide antiviral interventions. AVR 
fitness will vary across populations if the drug pressure in each localities are different. 
Therefore, comparison of AVR fitness estimates from different populations should account 
for heterogeneities in drug pressure. We have demonstrated how to do this in our case study 
1 in which we jointly estimate intrinsic AVR fitness and drug pressure in Japan using data 
from 10 populations (see Appendix page 4).
Our study has several important limitations. First, our method is applicable only when AVS 
and AVR strains co-circulate and hence cannot be used to estimate the fitness of a newly 
emerged AVR strain that has not yet spread in the community. Second, our method requires 
accurate specification of the generation time distribution. If data on exposure or onset times 
of infector-infectee pairs are available, our method can be extended to jointly infer the 
generation time distribution (see Appendix page 4). The resulting fitness estimate remains 
largely unbiased, but its precision would be lower due to uncertainty in the generation time 
distribution. Third, our method has not accounted for importation of AVS and AVR viruses. 
In the presence of such importation, our method would still be valid if (i) cases with recent 
travel history are excluded from AVR surveillance and (ii) the number of imported cases is 
small compared to incidence from local transmission (which is generally the case after the 
local epidemic has undergone exponential growth for 1–2 weeks).
Timely and accurate estimates of AVR fitness is important during both inter-pandemic and 
pandemic periods because the spread of AVR viruses can substantially attenuate the 
effectiveness of antivirals. Robust real-time interpretation of AVR surveillance data for 
estimating AVR fitness is thus an essential but currently missing function of AVR 
surveillance. Our method has the potential to fill this knowledge gap and can be easily 
integrated into contemporary surveillance systems.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. Validating the accuracy and precision of AVR fitness estimates when the sensitivity and 
specificity of AVR testing are both 100%
One hundred epidemic scenarios are randomly generated and 100 stochastic realizations of 
the data streams are simulated for each scenario (see Methods). AVR fitness is inferred at the 
end of each simulated epidemic. A Frequency distribution of the relative error in the fitness 
estimates  (i.e. )) across all scenarios and realizations when the daily AVR 
testing capacity is 2, 5, 10, 20 and 80 samples. The smaller the relative error, the more 
accurate the estimates. B Frequency distribution of the coefficient of variation of . The 
smaller the coefficient of variation, the more precise the estimates.
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Figure 2. A simulated example to illustrate the timeliness of reliable AVR fitness estimates
The epidemic parameters are  and . At time 0, 50% of each age 
group are susceptible and the epidemic is seeded with 10 AVS and 10 AVR infections. A–B 
Incidence of AVS and AVR infections in two fitness scenarios: σ = 1.05 or 0.95. C–D The 
daily number of reported cases. E–F The daily number of influenza-positive isolates that are 
AVS and AVR with a testing capacity of 10 samples per day. G–H Posterior distribution of 
the fitness estimate  on each day. Circles and error bars indicate the posterior medians and 
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the 95% credible intervals, respectively. I–J The posterior probability that AVR fitness is 
above 1.
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Figure 3. Surveillance data for seasonal influenza A(H1N1) and fitness estimates for the 
oseltamivir-resistant strain during 2007–2008 in Canada, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Japan, Netherlands, United States, Norway and Hong Kong
A The number of positive A(H1N1) virus isolates and the number of oseltamivir-sensitive 
and resistant A(H1N1) isolates over time in each population. B Fitness estimates for the 
oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) virus under three assumed generation time distributions. The 
pooled AVR fitness estimate (at the top) is obtained by assuming that AVR fitness was the 
same in all populations.
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Figure 4. Retrospective real-time fitness estimate for the oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus that circulated in Hokkaido, Japan during the 2013–2014 influenza season
A Data on influenza A(H1N1) activity and AVR surveillance. B Weekly fitness estimate 
using the same generation time distributions considered in Figure 3. C The posterior 
probability that AVR fitness was above 1.
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Figure 5. Estimating AVR fitness and drug pressure on the AVS strain posed by large-scale 
antiviral prophylaxis
The epidemic parameters are the same as that in Figure 2 with intrinsic AVR fitness  = 
0.95. We assume that antiviral prophylaxis reduces susceptibility by 81% and the 
prophylaxis coverage is 10%, 15% and 20% so that the drug pressure μ is 0.08, 0.12 and 
0.16, respectively. Large-scale antiviral intervention is suspended after the posterior 
probability of σ > 1 is greater than 0.9 for seven consecutive days. Cyan shade indicates the 
time period during which large-scale antiviral intervention is implemented. A The daily 
number of reported cases. B The daily number of influenza-positive isolates that are AVS 
and AVR with a testing capacity of 10 samples per day. C Posterior distribution of the AVR 
fitness estimate on each day. Circles and error bars indicate the posterior medians and the 
95% credible intervals, respectively. D Posterior distribution of the estimates for drug 
pressure on the AVS strain at the baseline level (i.e. before large-scale antiviral interventions 
is suspended). E The posterior probability that AVR fitness is above 1.
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